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The  paper looks at  a  model  of  directed  technical  change  in  an  environmental-economics 
context. Firms can do conventional or "green" R&D or they can abate emissions at the end of 
pipe. The paper has two main foci. On the one hand, it investigates the impact of environ-
mental regulation on the allocation of resources to conventional R&D, green R&D, and end-
of-pipe abatement. On the other hand, it addresses the question whether stricter emission 
standards should be used to support green R&D and/or economic growth.  
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Green R&D versus End-of-Pipe Emission Abatement:  
A Model of Directed Technical Change    
1 Introduction 
Does strict environmental regulation foster innovation and economic growth? The so-called 
Porter hypothesis argues that it does. See Porter (1990) and Porter/van der Linde (1995). 
Standard economic theory in contrast suggests that tighter constraints such as stricter environ-
mental  product  and  process  standards  always  deteriorate  material  well-being.  In  order  to 
address the issue, I construct a simple dynamic environmental-economics model with research 
and development (R&D) into cleaner technologies of production. Firms adopting these cleaner 
technologies will spend less on end-of-pipe emission abatement. This benefit, though, comes 
at a cost since green R&D itself uses scarce resources which could be utilized profitably for 
other purposes in the economy as well. Thus, it is unclear whether, (i) tighter environmental 
standards will induce a shift from end-of-pipe to process-integrated emission abatement, (ii) 
tighter environmental standards will induce more R&D and growth, and (iii) whether, in a 
normative  perspective,  governments  should  implement  stricter  standards  in  a  world  with 
green R&D than in a world without. This paper is an attempt to answer the three questions.  
The model is set up as follows. In a competitive market economy, two types of capital are 
accumulated, conventional capital, which pollutes the environment when used in production, 
and green capital, which doesn't. Remaining emissions can be abated at the end of the pipe, 
the abatement requirement – and, thus, the abatement cost, too - depending on the stringency 
of environmental regulation. Firms decide on how to allocate resources between conventional 
R&D, green R&D, and end-of-pipe abatement and the government determines the environ-
mental standard. In order to introduce a motive for government interventions going beyond 
the mere internalization of pollution externalities, I assume that there are positive knowledge 
spillovers in the R&D sector.  
There are different ways of modelling R&D in economics. This analysis will be carried out 
in an endogenous-growth framework, economic growth being driven by the accumulation of 
physical  capital  and  technological  know-how.  For  the  sake  of  simplification,  I  will  not 
distinguish between physical and knowledge capital but instead use aggregate variables en-
compassing  both  aspects  of  capital.  The  process  of  accumulation  is  modelled  à  la  Jones 
(1995), where existing capital/knowledge advances the accumulation of new capital/ know-2 
 
ledge,  albeit  at  a  decreasing  rate.  Moreover,  as  already  mentioned,  knowledge  spillovers 
across firms are taken into account. This approach is combined with modelling elements from 
the directed-technical-change  literature,  which  was  initiated  by Acemoglu/Zilibotti  (2001) 
and Acemoglu (2002) and applied to issues of environmental regulation by Ricci (2007), 
Balcão Reis/Cunha-e-Sá/ Leitão (2008), and Grimaud/Rouge (2008).
1 Grimaud/Rouge (2008) 
differs from the other two papers (and from this one as well) by looking at an exhaustible 
resource as an input. Balcão Reis/Cunha-e-Sá/Leitão (2008) do not consider knowledge spill-
overs across firms as a source of inefficiency, but assume monopolistic pricing by innovators. 
Moreover, I assume a constant level of emissions despite the fact that the economy grows, 
whereas  Balcão Reis/Cunha-e-Sá/Leitão (2008) have growing emissions, which will certain-
ly be unsustainable over an infinite time horizon. Ricci's (2007) model is closer to the one in 
this paper, but still differs in several ways. He assumes that technological change affects the 
emission intensity of capital whereas I distinguish between green and conventional capital. 
He assumes constant returns to knowledge in the generation of new knowledge, whereas I 
assume decreasing returns. Moreover, I consider the possibility of end-of-pipe abatement and 
address optimal environmental policies, which Ricci (2007) doesn't.  
In one respect, the present paper differs from all the other ones mentioned above in that I 
employ an algebraically much simpler and, therefore, more conveniently tractable model of 
innovation and technical progress. For example, the model is solved for general production 
functions without taking recourse to Cobb-Douglas or CES specifications. The twist is to 
assume only one type of agent in the private sector of the economy, a capital-owning entre-
preneur who does her R&D in-house, who save and consumes. Other papers, in contrast,  
assume up to four different groups of agents: households, which save and consume; capital 
owners, who accumulate capital; innovators, who do R&D; and entrepreneurs, who combine 
capital and technology in order to produce. If the markets on which these agents interact are 
perfectly competitive, then the simple homogenous-representative-agent model generates the 
same  results  as  its  more elaborated  (and  more intricate)  general-equilibrium  version  with 
heterogeneous agents. The investigation is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
model. Section 3 looks at the private sector's optimum, derives the economy's growth path 
and  derives  some  comparative  statics.  The  fourth  section  is  devoted  to  the  government's 
                                                 
1   There are many other papers on technological change and economic growth in the environmental-
economics context, but I confine myself to the directed-technical-change literature because only 
this is directly relevant in the context of the present analysis. 3 
 
optimum environmental policy in a second-best world. Section 5 looks at the first best and 
Section 6 summarizes. 
 
2 The Model 
Let us consider an economy consisting of a continuum of identical firms run by capital-
owning entrepreneurs who use identical technologies to produce a homogenous GDP good. 
The representative capitalist-entrepreneur maximizes the present value of future utility, the 
discount rate being δ, 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ∫
∞ − +
0 dt e u t C ln
t δ ε , 
where  lnC(t)  is  the  utility  derived  from  consumption  or  dividend  income  at  time  t,
2  ε  is 
environmental quality as determined by an ambient standard set by the government and u(.) is 
an  increasing  and  concave  utility function.  Like  in Acemoglu/Zilibotti  (2001),  Acemoglu 
(2002),  Ricci  (2007),  Balcão  Reis/Cunha-e-Sá/Leitão  (2008),  and  Grimaud/Rouge  (2008), 
and there are two types of capital. Firms use conventional capital, K(t), and green capital, 
G(t), to produce an output F(K(t),G(t)), where F(.,.) is a well-behaved neoclassical production 
function with constant returns to-scale (CRS) satisfying the Inada conditions. Output is used 
for consumption, for investment in capital of either type, and for end-of-pipe emission abate-
ment: 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 = − + − − t K w t R t R t C t G , t K F G K ε χ .        (1) 
RK(t) and RG(t) denote research and development to generate new capital of types K and G, 
respectively, with w as a constant and exogenous opportunity cost of research. In the real 
world, RK(t) and RG(t) may be approximated by numbers of patents. In contrast to the other 
directed-technical-change  models,  innovation  takes  place  within  the  firm.  Environmental 
regulation  is  of  the  command-and-control  type.  The  government  sets  the  environmental 
standard, ε, which is constant and taken as a binding constraint by the firm. The cost of 
achieving this environmental standard is proportional to installed conventional capital, K(t), 
and it is increasing and convex in the strictness of environmental regulation, i.e. χ '>0, χ ">0. 
                                                 
2    By taking the log of consumption, I assume a special utility function with a unit elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution. One can show that the qualitative results of this paper go through for the 
more general case as well as long as the elasticity is not too large, the critical value being larger 
than 1. Given that realistic estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are in the range 
0.7 to 0.8 (Hall 1988, Guvenen 2006), the error made by assuming a unit elasticity seems tolerable. 4 
 
Unlike other models of endogenous growth in environmental economics where steady-state 
emissions grow over time, I assume that spending a constant share of GDP on abatement 
suffices to keep emissions constant. The empirical evidence cited in Brock/Taylor (2004) 
suggests that the abatement cost share has indeed been almost constant in most industrialized 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s and that emissions have not increased (but instead even 
declined) during this period. 
The accumulation of conventional and  green capital is modelled à la Jones (1995)
3 in 
equations (2) and (3), where dots above variables denote derivatives with respect to time and 
the functions A(.,.,.) and B(.,.,.) are concave, have CRS, positive first derivatives and satisfy 
the Inada conditions: 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t R , t * K , t K A t K K = & .              (2) 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t R , t * G , t G B t G G = & .              (3) 
Knowledge spillovers are modelled via K*(t) and G*(t), which denote the economy-wide 
stocks of conventional and green capital, respectively. Ex post they are equal to the stocks 
employed  by  the  representative  firm:  K*(t)=K(t)  and  G*(t)=G(t).  Ex  ante,  however,  pro-
ducers take K*(t) and G*(t) as exogenously given. Some other papers, e.g. Sue Wing (2006) 
and Ricci (2007), assume spillovers in R&D flows whereas I assume that the spillover is due 
to knowledge stocks, which I think is more plausible. Finally, it the initial levels of the two 
stocks, K0 and G0, are given historically. Since the two types of capital are perfectly malleable 
in this model, K and G are summable.
4 As a normalization, assume that K0+G0=1. 
  Summarizing the model, the economy is characterized by CRS in the accumulable factors 
and will, therefore, grow at a constant rate. Conventional capital enhances output but pollutes 
the environment. Reductions of pollution are possible at some cost with an end-of-pipe clean-
up  technology,  which  is  modeled  only  rudimentarily  via  a  cost  function.  Alternatively, 
producers  can  invest  in  green  capital,  which  is  a  substitute  for  conventional  capital  in 
production but does not pollute the environment. This green investment is tantamount to an 
                                                 
3   Jones (1995) assumes that R&D is done by labour, which is inelastically supplied in the economy, 
whereas I assume that R&D expenditure is a share of GDP.  
4   Malleability is due to the fact that the rates of investment, RK(t)  and RG(t), enter the budget con-
straint in a linear fashion. Thus, it is possible to turn capital of type K into capital of type G or vice 
versa in an instant by letting one rate of investment go to infinity and the other one to minus in-
finity. 5 
 
investment in process-integrated pollution abatement – as opposed to end-of-pipe abatement. 
Knowledge spillovers across firms (but, as a simplification of the model, not across con-
ventional  and  green  R&D)  generate  externalities  that  require  government  intervention. 
Finally, perfect malleability ensures that the economy can jump to its steady-state capital 
allocation instantaneously at t=0 such that transitional dynamics do not have to be considered. 
 
3 Solution of the Model 
For the sake of notational brevity, I omit arguments of functions in much of the remainder of 
the paper as long as this does not cause ambiguities. The current-value Hamiltonian is 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) K K G K R *, G , G B R *, K , K A K w R R C G , K F u C ln H β α ε χ ξ ε + + − + − − + + =  
and the first-order conditions are 
    ξ =
−1 C ,                    (4) 
    ξ β α w B A R R = = ,                  (5) 
    ( ) ( )ξ χ α δ α − − − = K K F A & ,               (6) 
    ( ) G G F B ξ β δ β − − = & ,                (7) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives multivariate functions and where the arguments of 
all functions have been omitted. I consider a balanced growth path with all time-dependent 
variables  growing  at  the  same  rate.  Due  to  the  CRS  assumption,  all  first  derivatives  in 
equations (5) to (7) are then constant. Establishing growth rates in equations (4) and (5) and 
using (5) to substitute for ξ  in (6) and (7) yields 
    ( ) δ δ χ − + = − − + =
− −
G R G K R K F B w B F A w A C ˆ 1 1 .        (8) 
Equation (8) contains two standard results of economic growth theory. The first one is a 
variant of Ramsey's rule of optimum saving. The economy's growth rate equals the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution (which is one in this model) times the marginal productivity of 
capital minus the discount rate. Here the marginal productivity of capital has two components 6 
 
since accumulation of capital does not only enhance production but also the future accum-
ulation of capital. The second result is an indifference condition: the two types of capital are 
equally productive in the optimum. 
  Since all variables grow at the same rate along the balanced growth path, the ratios of the 
time-dependent variables are fixed. Define c=C/K, g=G/K, rK=RK/K, rG=RG/G, k*=K*/K, 
and g*=G*/G. Note that k*=g*=1 ex post. Moreover, from the properties of CRS functions, 
( ) ( )
K
G , K F
G
K





 ≡ 1 ,  ( ) ( )
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 ≡ 1 , and  ( ) ( )
G













 ≡ 1 . 
Then,  r R a A = ,  r K * k K a r a a A − − = ,  r R b B = ,  r G * g G b r b b B − − = ,  ' f FG = , and  ' gf f FK − = . 
Using all this in equation (8), we get three conditions that determine the steady-state growth 
path (see the appendix for their derivation). 
    ( ) ( ) G K r , b r , a 1 1 = ,                   (9) 
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    ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ε χ
δ














.          (11) 
These equations determine g, rG, and rK.
 5 Equation (9) states that G and K grow at the same 
rate. Equations (10) and (11) state that the marginal productivities of G and K (right-hand 
sides) equal the marginal cost of supplying G and K (left-hand sides), which is increasing in 
the cost of R&D, in the discount rate, and the non-internalized knowledge spillover and de-
creasing in the productivity of R&D in the creation of new capital. Due to malleability, firms 
can relocate capital instantaneously at time 0 such that the green-to-conventional-capital ratio, 
g, implied by equations (9) to (11) is valid from the beginning and there are no transitional 
dynamics. With the normalization K0+G0=1, the allocation of capital at time t=0 turns out to 
be  














0 .              (12) 
                                                 
5   It is this step where the logarithmic utility function leads to considerable simplifications. Equations 
(10) and (11) would be more complex with an elasticity of intertemporal utility not equalling 1. 7 
 
  To derive the impact of environmental regulation on g, rG, and rK, totally differentiate 
equations (9) to (11): 




































































































and the comparative statics of the steady state are      
    











































2 2 1 1 δ δ
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<0,       (13a) 
   











































2 2 1 1 δ δ
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<0,     (13b) 
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>0     (13c) 
Stricter environmental standards induce declines in the steady-state rates of investment in 
both conventional and green capital (equations (13a,b)), but the share of green capital in total 
capital rises (equation (13c)). Given that a change in ε  will induce an instantaneous shift in 
the composition of capital at time 0, we have that G(0) will rise whereas K(0) will be reduced 
according to equations (12). Translated into the real world, where perfect malleability does 
not exist, the implication is that stricter environmental regulation tends to induce additional 
green R&D in the short run, but generally reduces the rate of innovation in the longer term. 
The latter implies that the steady-state economic growth rate is negatively affected by stricter 
environmental policy: da/dε = db/dε < 0. This confirms Ricci's (2007) finding.  8 
 
  The  economic  intuition  behind  the  results  is  straightforward.  Tighter  environmental 
standards raise the cost of using conventional capital and it is therefore substituted by green 
capital such that g is increased. The higher cost of using conventional capital reduces the 
incentive to accumulate this capital in the longer term. Due to the shift from conventional to 
green capital, the marginal productivity of green capital is reduced (f "<0) and this reduces the 
incentive to invest in this type of capital as well. 
rK and rG measure rates of investment related to the corresponding capital stocks, e.g. 
number of new patents as a share of the cumulative number of patents. Alternatively, one 
might wish to look at R&D expenditure as a share of GDP. The following three equations 
present the effects of stricter environmental regulation on the R&D expenditure shares of K-
type and G-type capital and on the share of end-of-pipe abatement cost in GDP, respectively. 
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.               (14c) 
Equation (14a) shows that the share of GDP spent on conventional R&D will unambiguously 
decline.  The  effects  on  the  GDP  shares  of  green  R&D  and  end-of-pipe  abatement  are 
ambiguous. How resources are allocated to end-of-pipe abatement versus integrated tech-
nology, depends on the parameters of the model, in particular on the productivity of green 
capital  and  on  the  cost  of  using  end-of-pipe  technologies.  The  ratio  of  green  capital  to 
resources spent on end-of-pipe abatement is 

































,         (14d) 
with  ( ) 1 0, ∈ γ   being  defined  in  the  appendix.  It  is  seen  that  a  shift  from  end-of-pipe  to 
process-integrated abatement is likely if the cost of end-of-pipe abatement measured as a 
share of GDP is high, if the elasticities │gf"/f'│and gf'/f are small and (from closer inspection 
of γ) if the spillovers in green R&D are large and those in conventional R&D are small. 9 
 
4. Welfare Effects and Second-Best Environmental Policy 
Given the fact that there are two knowledge spillovers and an environmental externality in the 
model, the government would need three instruments to achieve the first-best optimum: two 
subsidies to improve the incentives to do conventional and green R&D and an environmental 
standard to deal with the environmental externality. However, I will initially look at a second-
best world in which environmental regulation is the only policy variable. The first best will be 
addressed afterwards. The second best is interesting not only from a theoretical viewpoint, it 
is also very relevant from a policy perspective. An argument often made in favour of strict 
environmental policies is that they spur R&D and accelerate innovation. However, this makes 
sense only if the appropriate instruments, which support R&D and innovation directly, are not 
or not sufficiently used.  
  Given the economy's constant growth rate, a(1,rK)= b(1,rG), the utility function can be 
rewritten (details in the third part of the appendix) 





δ g ln c ln u r , a
dt u t C ln e
K t + − +
+ = + ∫
∞ − 1 1
2 0 , 
where (12) was used to substitute ( )
1 1
− + g  for  ( ) 0 K . The consumption-to-capital ratio, c, is 
determined via equation (1) such that  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ε χ − + − = w gr r g f c G K ,              (15) 
and by using (10) and (11), we have 
    ( )
( )
( )























,            (15') 
According to (15'), the consumption-to-capital ratio is increasing in the discount rate and in 
the non-internalized technology spillovers. This is an expected result: the lack of internal-
zation  of  the  positive  R&D  externality  will  make  the  economy  more  myopic.  It  is  also 
intuitive  that  an  increase  in  the  R&D  productivities  ar  and  br  makes  the  economy  shift 
resources from consumption to R&D expenditure and thereby lowers c. By similar reasoning 
the positive impact of the direct cost of R&D effort, w, on c appears plausible. The effect of 
tighter environmental regulation on c is ambiguous. 10 
 
  Inserting (15) into the welfare function, taking the derivative with respect to ε, and using 
equations (10), (13a), (13b), and (15') to simplify terms where appropriate (details in the 
appendix), we have 






























.    (16) 
where ∆>0 is the denominator of the comparative-statics expressions in equations (13a) to 
(13c) and dg/dε is given by equation (13c). Condition (16) contains several terms that are 
familiar  from  environmental  economics.  Noting  that  1/C  is  the  marginal  utility  of  con-
sumption, Cu'(ε) on the left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between environ-
mental quality and consumption, i.e. the marginal environmental damage. In a static world 
without R&D directed at cleaner technologies, it would equal the marginal cost of end-of-
pipe abatement. This is the first term on the right-hand side of equation (16), χ'K. The re-
mainder of equation (16) contains effects of knowledge spillovers and of costs of developing 
cleaner integrated technologies. Let us divide by K and take cu'=χ ' as a benchmark. This case 
is depicted in Figure 1 by solid lines, the marginal abatement cost increasing and the marginal 
environmental damage declining in ε (and, thus, increasing in pollution). Additional terms on 
the right-hand side of equation (16) shift the χ ' line either upwards or downwards. The dotted 
 
  







lines  in  Figure  1  show  that  upward  shifts  imply  laxer  environmental  regulation  and  that 
downward shifts imply an increase of ε. Let us start from the last term on the right-hand side 
of equation (16). It is positive and vanishes only in the absence of knowledge spillovers. This 
term contains the growth component of the R&D externalities. Without internalization, the 
income share spent on R&D is too low, the economic growth rate is too low as well and, as 
the first-best instruments are not available, the optimum response is to relax environmental 
regulation.  The  second  term  on the  right-hand  side  of  equation  contains  the  composition 
effect arising from the relocation of capital from type K to type G. It is increasing in the direct 
cost of R&D effort, w, and in the discount rate, it contains the productivities of conventional 
and green R&D, ar and br, respectively, and it contains the spillovers ak* and bg*. Everything 
else being equal, an increase in ak* will induce an upward shift in the χ ' line and induce a re-
duction in ε , whereas an increase in bg* shifts the curve downwards and leads to stricter 
environmental  standards.
6  In  the  case  of  highly  asymmetric  spillovers  with  bg*>>ak*,  the 
optimum environmental regulation may be stricter than in the benchmark scenario where the 
environmental standard addresses the environmental externality only. The underlying reason 
is that a market economy under laisser faire does not generate enough green capital. A stricter 
environmental standard induces the desired shift from K to G, albeit at the cost of lowering 
the economic growth rate.  
The results derived from condition (16) can be summarized as follows: 
•  Large  knowledge  spillovers  in  general  reduce  growth  and  make  firms  behave  too 
myopically. In order to correct for this and to boost economic growth, the environ-
mental standard should be relaxed. 
•  If the G spillover is large compared to the K spillover, this leads to unfavourably low 
stocks of green capital. The desirable shift from conventional to green capital can be 
achieved by stricter environmental standards than in the benchmark case. 
In  general,  the  combined  effect  is  ambiguous.  Optimal  environmental  standards  may  be 
stricter or laxer than those internalizing the pure environmental externality. Although both 
scenarios are theoretically feasible, the case of tighter standards is probably less relevant in 
practice. It requires that spillovers are highly asymmetric, the green sector being subject to 
                                                 
6   Note that dg/dε contains spillover terms, too. Closer inspection of equation (13c) reveals that 
dg/dε  is increasing in bg* and decreasing in ak*. These additional effects may reinforce or mitigate 
those originating from the occurrence of the spillover terms in the expression in brackets in front of 
dg/dε. 12 
 
substantial cross-fertilization amongst firms whereas spillovers are small to negligible in the 
conventional sector. Otherwise, the growth effect will dominate and result in laxer environ-
mental standards. 
 
5. The First-Best Policy 
A first-best policy uses three instruments to address the three externalities prevailing in this 
model. Assume that subsidies are paid to firms for the accumulation of conventional and 
green capital, the subidy rates being sK and sG, respectively. The optimality conditions (10) 
and (11) are changed slightly by adding sG and sK on the right-hand sides of equation (10) and 
(11), respectively. The optimum subsidy rates are 





s = ,                    (17) 





s = .                    (18) 
Inspection of the comparative statics shows that both subsidies raise the R&D rates and, thus, 
the rate of economic growth as well. This confirms the result obtained by See Balcão Reis/ 
Cunha-e-Sá/Leitão (2008). If the positive knowledge externalities are large and the negative 
environmental externality is small, then the optimally managed economy grows at a larger 
rate than the laisser-faire economy. If, however, the environmental externality dominates the 
knowledge spillover, the result is reversed.  
  The environmental regulation in the first-best optimum is determined by 





















,              (19) 
which is condition (16) without the knowledge-spillover terms. The first term on the right-
hand side is clear, the second one still deserves an explanation. It measures the intertemporal 
component of marginal abatement cost, which arises from the change in capital allocation 
induced by a change in environmental policy. For the interpretation of the term in brackets, 
remember  that  the  factor  price  frontier,  known  from  neoclassical  production  theory, 13 
 
establishes a negative relationship between the marginal productivities in a CRS production 
function. This implies that the marginal productivities of accumulated capital of type K and 
type G (including the productivity effect of the spillover) in the generation of new knowledge 
are increasing in the inverse R&D productivities, 1/ar and 1/br, respectively. Thus, the term in 
brackets is positive (negative) if AK+AK* is large (small) compared to BG+BG*. Everything else 
being equal, the marginal cost of abatement is large if conventional capital is very productive 
in the generation of new conventional capital and it is small if green capital is very productive 
in the generation of new green capital In the former case the optimum environmental standard 
should be lax; in the latter case it should be strict. 
 
6. Summary 
The  investigation  of  this  simple  endogenous-growth  model  has  produced  the  following 
insights 
•  Conventional capital tends to be replaced by green capital if environmental standards 
are tightened. 
•  In the short run, tighter environmental standards foster green R&D. 
•  In  the  long-run  steady-state,  R&D  rates  are  reduced  by  tighter  environmental 
standards, both for conventional as well as for green capital. 
•  The steady-state  growth rate of the  economy is declining in tighter environmental 
standards. 
•  End-of-pipe abatement tends to be replaced by process-integrated abatement if its cost 
is high and if green R&D is subject to substantial knowledge spillovers compared to 
conventional R&D.  
•  A second-best optimum environmental policy  that takes  knowledge spillovers into 
account is likely to be too lax compared to the benchmark of marginal damage equals 
marginal  abatement  cost.  The  converse  is  theoretically  possible  if  green  R&D  is 
subject to substantially larger positive externalities than conventional R&D. 
•  The first-best policy combines subsidization of capital accumulation with an environ-
mental standard that equates marginal environmental damage and marginal abatement 
cost.  The  marginal  abatement  cost  includes  an  intertemporal  component  which  is 
small if the productivity of green capital in the generation of new green capital is large 14 
 
and large if the productivity of conventional capital in the generation of new con-
ventional capital is large. 
Coming back to the question posed in the beginning, this model does not support the dynamic 
version of Porter's hypothesis. Everything else being equal, tighter environmental standards 
retard rather than accelerate long-term economic growth despite potentially substantial spill-
overs in the green R&D sector. This is like in Ricci's (2007) paper. In general, it seems 
difficult to construct models of directed technical change such that the balanced growth rate 
of the economy is increased by tighter environmental regulation. For a special modelling 
strategy,  see  Hart  (2007),  but  also  Ricci's  (2007)  critique  of  Hart's  approach.
7  As  an 
alternative, one might think of models with non-balanced growth paths, in which substantial 
knowledge spillovers in the green sector drive the economy's R&D and its long-term growth 
while the share of conventional capital goes to zero. This may be an interesting road of future 
research in theoretical environmental economics, but is an open question whether such  a 
dominance of green capital over conventional capital is realistic. On the empirical side, it 
would be interesting to test other predictions of this paper, particularly those concerning the 
crowding out of conventional by green R&D and about the expenditure shares going into 
green  R&D  versus  end-of-pipe  abatement.  Given  the  limited  availability  of  data  and  the 
problem to distinguish process-integrated from end-of-pipe abatement in practice, existing 
studies like Frondel/Horbach/Rennings (2007) had to be more moderate in their ambitions. 
With  better  data,  however,  theory-driven  empirical  research  might  in  the  future  further 
enhance our understanding of the forces that drive environmental innovation and the policy 
instruments suitable to supporting them. 
 
                                                 
7   Of course, one can get higher growth rates from stricter environmental standards if environmental 
quality has a positive impact on factor productivities, but this is not the Porter hypothesis. 15 
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Appendix  
Some results in this paper are a bit cumbersome to be derived. Here are derivations step by 
step.  
 
A.1 Derivation of Equations 9 and 10 
The starting point is equation (8). 
    ( ) δ δ χ − + = − − + =
− −
G R G K R K F B w B F A w A C ˆ 1 1 .        (8) 
Note that G / B K / A C ˆ = =  because of equal growth rates and rewrite (8) such that 
    δ − + =
−
G R G F B w B
G
B 1 ,           
    ( ) δ χ − − + =
−
K R K F A w A
K
A 1 .       
Moving to lower-case letters for functions in intensive form, we have 
    δ − + − − =
− ' f b w b r b b b r r G * g
1 ,           
    ( ) δ χ − − − + − − =
− ' gf f a w a r a a a r r K * k
1 .      
Rearranging terms gives (10) and (11). 
 
A 2 Derivation of Equation (14d) 
Taking the derivative of g/χ with respect to ε yields 















/ g d 1
.        17 
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A3 Derivation of Equation 16 
We start from welfare: 






0 2 0 0
K ln c ln u a
dt u C ln at e dt u t C ln e
t t + +
+ = + + = + ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ − . 




δ / a dt e at
t ,  which  follows  from  partial  integration  (or  from  looking  
into  a  comprehensive  mathematics  formulary).  Using  ( ) ( )
1 1 0
− + = g K   and  
( ) ( ) ( ) ε χ − + − = w gr r g f c G K , utility can be rewritten as 





δ g ln w gr r g f ln u r , a
dt u t C ln e
G K K t + − − + − +
+ = + ∫
∞ − 1 1
2 0 . 
Differentiating with respect to ε, setting the result equal to zero and multiplying by δ  yields 
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ε ε δ
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w r ' f
c
' u
K r G K
G .     
Multiply by c and rearrange terms: 18 
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w / ' b
d
dr r K −




w / ' a
d
dr r G −
= , where ∆ is used 
to replace the bulky term in the numerators of equations (13a) and (13b). Moreover, we can 
use (10) to substitute for (f'-rGw): 





































.     
Now use (15') to substitute for c on the right-hand side 




































































+ = 1 1
1
. 
Collecting and rearranging terms then yields 






























.     
Finally multiply by K to obtain (16) with Cu' on the left-hand side. 